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The capacity of the quantum dense key distribution (QDKD) [Phys. Rev. A69, 032310
(2004)] is doubled by introducing the dense coding. The security of the improved
QDKD against eavesdropping is pointed out to be easily proven. In both the original
QDKD and the present improved QDKD, a strategy to double the efficiency of
generating the secret key with given length is proposed. In addition, we point out a
leak of security of the original QDKD and fix it.
PACS Number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Hk
Recently, Bostroem and Felbinger [1] have proposed a deterministic secure direct communication
protocol, where the original idea that the secure information is encoded by a local operation on
a photon of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) photon pair is presented. However, in favor of a
secure transmission, in their protocol they abandon the dense coding feature. It is known that the
quantum dense coding (QDC, a different concept from the dense coding) by using local operations
on one particle of EPR pair shared by two parties doubles basically the capacity of transmission
of a classical channel [2]. So very recently, I. P. Degiovanni et al [3] have proposed a deterministic
quantum dense key distribution (QDKD) by including the advantages of the QDC by using local
unitary operations and the quantum key distribution (QKD) in [1] in generating shared secret keys
and enhancing transmission capacity. In fact, the transmission capacity of the QKD in Ref. [1]
can be doubled by introducing the dense coding and the security has been proven [4]. Therefore,
the QDKD proposed very recently by I. P. Degiovanni et al [3] can be further improved. We briefly
report it in this paper. In addition, we point out a leak of security in the original QDKD and fix
it.
Our present improved QDKD is depicted simply as follows. The four Bell states of photons
h and t are |Ψ±
ht
〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉h|1〉t ± |1〉h|0〉t) and |Φ±ht〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉h|0〉t ± |1〉h|1〉t). Alice
prepares an entangled photon pair in the state |Ψ+
ht
〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉h|1〉t + |1〉h|0〉t), and she stores
photon h in her lab, whereas she performs randomly with one of the local unitary operations
u0 = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|, u1 = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, u2 = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|, u3 = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| on photon
t and then sends it to Bob. After this the initial state |Ψ+
ht
〉 changes into |Ψ+
ht
〉 = u0|Ψ+ht〉,
|Ψ−
ht
〉 = u1|Ψ+ht〉, |Φ+ht〉 = u2|Ψ+ht〉, or |Φ−ht〉 = u3|Ψ+ht〉, so Alice’s random selection of the unitary
operations can be taken as a two-bit encoding of her secret key on the EPR pair, i.e., u0 as ’00’,
u1 as ’01’, u2 as ’10’ and u3 as ’11’. When Bob receives the photon t, he can have two choices.
One choice is that he performs a measurement on the photon t by choosing randomly either the
base {|0〉t, |1〉t} or the base {(|0〉t + |1〉t)/
√
2, (|0〉t − |1〉t)/
√
2} and then he publicly announces
the base he used and his measurement result. After Bob’s public announcement Alice performs
2her measurement on the photon h by choosing the same base as Bob. Since she knows which
unitary operation she has performed on the photon t, in the case of u0 or u1 ( u2 or u3), if she
finds that her measurement result is correlated (anticorrelated) with Bob’s measurement result,
she tells Bob that Eve is in the line and then their transmission is aborted. Otherwise, their
transmission continues. The other choice of Bob is that he encodes his bits via performing one
of the four local unitary operation on the photon t and then sends it back to Alice. When Alice
receives the back photon t, she performs the Bell state measurement on the photons h and t
and announce publicly her measurement result. Then both Bob (Alice) can know the exact local
unitary operation performed by Alice (Bob) on the photon t (see table 1). Thus the QDKD has
been improved to have double capacity of transmission. In addition, in the original QDKD and the
present improved QDKD, one of the two different secret keys is discarded to guarantee the complete
security of the encrypted message. This is a serious waste. In quantum cryptography, generally
speaking, the length of the secret key is shorter than the length of the messages, however, the
longer the secret key, the securer the message. Hence, we suggest to adopt an additivity strategy
to combine the two different keys as one. This strategy will double the efficiency of generating
the secret key with given length. In fact, such improved QDKD is not secure under Eve’s (the
eavesdropper’s) intercept-measure-resent attacks without eavesdropping [5], i.e., Eve intercepts
and measures directly the back photon t and then resends it to Bob, while Alice and Bob can not
detect on the existence of Eve by comparing their measurement results and it is quite possible that
their secret keys are incorrect. So after the transmission of the secret key, Alice and Bob have to
publicly announce a fraction of their keys to check whether Eve has ever been in the line during
the transmissions. Incidentally, very similar to the justifications in Ref.[1,3,4], the security of the
present improved QDKD against eavesdropping can be easily proven. In addition, the original
QDKD [3] is also not secure under Eve’s intercept-measure-resent attacks without eavesdropping
[5]. This is a leak of the original QDKD. We propose to fix it by the public announcement of a
fraction of the secret keys to verify whether Eve has ever been in the line during the transmission.
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3Table 1. Corresponding relations among Alice’s, Bob’s unitary u operations (i.e.,
the encoding bits) and Alice’s Bell measurement results on photons h and t.
Alice’s (Bob’s) u operations are listed in the first column (line).
u0(00) u1(01) u2(10) u3(11)
u0(00) |Ψ+ht〉 |Ψ−ht〉 |Φ+ht〉 |Φ−ht〉
u1(01) |Ψ−ht〉 |Ψ+ht〉 |Φ−ht〉 |Φ+ht〉
u2(10) |Φ+ht〉 |Φ−ht〉 |Ψ+ht〉 |Ψ−ht〉
u3(11) |Φ−ht〉 |Φ+ht〉 |Ψ−ht〉 |Ψ+ht〉
